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Egypt in Search of An Alternative

By Rawia M Tawfikii

A few weeks ago, hundreds of Egyptians welcomed Mohamed El-Baradei, the former director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Nobel Prize laureate, upon his return to Egypt after leaving his UN post. Ahead of his return, a number of social movements called on him to consider running in the upcoming presidential election in 2011 against the 82 year old Mubarak, who has been in power since 1981.

The rise of El-Baradei indicates new developments in the Egyptian landscape, but also manifests the predicaments of its political system. One of the interesting developments is the increase in the level of political activism that gave rise to a number of new social movements in the last few years. Supporters of El-Baradei include members of the Egyptian Movement for Change, the 9th of March Movement, as well as other independent forces. This is in addition to a campaign begun with the sole aim of supporting the presidential candidacy of El-Baradei.

However, for change to occur in the leadership and nature of the Egyptian state, the mobilisation of popular support for change in the institutional settings of this state is needed. Little wonder, then, that El-Baradei himself called for the mobilisation of popular support for democratisation under the slogan "together we are able to change." In a sense, as an Egyptian scholar and activist argued, the heroic welcome of El-Baradei is a sign of apathy rather than activism. Instead of generating new leaders and pressuring the regime for democratisation, Egyptians are waiting for a messiah. In other words, even if a credible leader who could direct the march of political change existed, the popular momentum to compel such a change seems to be in short supply.

So far, the evidence of wide support for El-Baradei that could change the political equation in his favour is lacking. His support is based on a number of loosely-organised issue-based movements, and some respected public figures. Most Egyptians remain politically apathetic, with turnout levels at elections not exceeding 25% according to official sources.

On the other hand, the institutional framework in Egypt is not one that allows for open and fair political competition. Of particular interest are the serious restrictions on the candidacy of independents. According to article 76 of the Constitution, which was amended in 2005 and 2007 to allow for multi-party presidential elections, independents need to secure the official approval of 90 members in the two houses of parliament and at least 140 members of municipal councils. In light of the ruling party's dominance over these representative institutions, these approvals are almost impossible to secure.

It came as no surprise, therefore, that El-Baradei proposed a number of pre-conditions for a free and fair election, and thus for his agreement to stand for election. These include ending the state of emergency that has been in effect since 1981, ensuring that elections are supervised by the judiciary in the presence of national and international observers, allowing fair media access to all presidential candidates, and protecting the right to stand for election by limiting its restrictions. To campaign for a change in the constitution to meet these conditions, El-Baradei announced the establishment of the National Front for Change.

The debate regarding El-Baradei's candidacy also indicates that opposition politics in Egypt is practiced outside of political parties. One can safely argue that the rise of a non-partisan figure points to a popular disenchantment with the current opposition parties, which no longer generate credible and popular political figures. El-Baradei has declared his refusal to run for an established party. In reaction to this debate, opposition parties have neither agreed on a position regarding the El-Baradei candidacy, nor have they decided on a single political candidate that can challenge Mubarak or the ruling party's candidate in the next elections. In a face-saving gesture, the major opposition parties have recently met to announce demands similar to those declared by El-Baradei.

The reaction of the ruling National Democratic Party to the rise of El-Baradei has been typical of its approach in dealing with political rivalries. At a press conference in Berlin on the 4th of March, President Mubarak said El-Baradei is welcome to run for the presidency, but he dismissed claims that the former IAEA official has become a national hero. As soon as his star began to rise, the state-controlled media embarked on a campaign to defame El-Baradei, questioning his political credentials. When this tool proved ineffectual, El-Baradei's supporters were targeted by the security forces. Leaders of the ruling party repeatedly declared that the constitution will not be changed in response to any person's demands.

In short, the search for an alternative to the dominant ruling party will continue. The prospects for peaceful change, however, remain dependent on mobilising popular support, reforming the institutional framework governing the political (including the electoral) process, and opposition forces reaching consensus on a reform agenda and a credible political challenger.

i The views reflected in this paper are those of the author and does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Institute for Islamic Studies (IIIS).
The International Institute of Islamic Studies (IIIS) aims to provide insight and solutions to issues associated with the Islamic world.

ii Rawia M. Tawfik is an Assistant Lecturer at the Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University and a D.Phil candidate at the Department of Politics and International Relations, the University of Oxford. She can be contacted at
rawia.amer stx.ox.ac.uk