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In The Crosshairs: Al Qaeda in The Arabian Peninsula

By Onnie Kok

It's Christmas Day, and passengers aboard North West Airlines flight 253 have had an uneventful journey since takeoff from Amsterdam. This changed on the approach to Detroit however, when 23 year-old Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, working with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), attempted to detonate the PETN (pentaerythritol) explosive device concealed in his underwear. Although the attack was botched, it has popped the lid on AQAP's regional, and now international, activities. AQAP is nothing new of course - recall the failed attempt on the life of Saudi Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, head of the Kingdom's counterterrorism operations, using the same type of explosive.

The failed Christmas bombing is significant for a number of reasons.

Firstly, the manner in which Abdulmutallab interacted with AQAP members presents an opportunity for the United States and other intelligence services to identify threats earlier and disrupt Jihadist activities. It is unclear exactly when and how contact was made, however Abdulmutallab's life at University College London (UCL) could have played a role.

Other than studying for a degree in mechanical engineering, Abdulmutallab was also president of UCL's Islamic society and, although in no way extremist, this may have facilitated contact with a person(s) affiliated to Al-Qaeda. The United Kingdom has a history of former students enrolled at British universities becoming involved in terror-linked attacks. In 2003 for example, British citizens Asif Mohammed Hanif and Omar Khan Sharif, enrolled at the time at King's College London, launched their suicide attack in Tel Aviv, Israel. Abdulmutallab is also the fourth president of a university Islamic society linked to a terror attack.

The emergence of these links appears to remain an intelligence blind spot. Intelligence services need to be aware of this and thoroughly investigate any known associates, contacts, other group members and outsiders. In the event that intelligence suggests other Abdulmutallabs, suspicious online contacts or otherwise, these individuals should be prevented from taking action by placing them on terrorist watch lists and no-fly lists. If properly utilised and disseminated to the proper authorities, such intelligence will speedily and effectively thwart like terror threats in future.

Secondly, and more importantly, the broader strategic significance of the attempted bombing points to the nature of AQAP's operational ability in Yemen. This ability is largely supported through local tribal and high level governmental religious and ideological sympathy towards "Al-Qaeda". Yemen affords AQAP a local support base, a deep pool of recruits and safe havens from which they plan and carry out terrorist attacks. However, this presents strategic difficulties as well as opportunities for US and Yemeni authorities. Strategically, the most effective way to fight AQAP is to disrupt these enabling factors in order to make carrying out attacks more difficult.

An important factor in disrupting AQAP's stable operational environment in Yemen is to undermine support for AQAP amongst the local population, particularly in the tribal regions. Traditionally, Yemeni society is religiously conservative Sunni and widely sympathetic to Al-Qaeda, whose members share numerous tribal links within tribal areas. Locals, as well as high ranking government officials also share much of Al-Qaeda's ideology and interpretation of Islam and the Sharia. Added to this is an already anti-American sentiment and resentment towards the Yemeni government for its policies and cooperation with the US, deep levels of corruption, marginalisation of Southerners and failed policies that have led to increasing unemployment and poverty. Yemen's population is also growing rapidly, which will add extra strain on an already suffering economy.

Recently, the increased US military assistance, aid and intelligence is a positive step, though for this to be successful in the long term, military action must run concomitant with smart politics and better economics. The US has an opportunity to address these issues by working closely with the Yemeni government to stabilise the economy and improving the lives of those living in tribal areas. Where this is successful, confidence in the government will increase and influential tribal leaders will have less need to support Al-Qaeda. Decreased local support for militants will likely disrupt operations as a result of cooperation between locals and the authorities and military action against them. International threats are likely to decrease as AQAP may focus on regional operations to ensure that they are more successful.

Putting pressure on the military is necessary to disrupt Al-Qaeda, and will also have the most immediate effect of fragmenting the group and temporarily pushing them back from Sanaa. However the US must be careful not to overdo it. The US would be wise not to give many of Yemen's war veterans a reason to return to war as Al-Qaeda militants. Tribal areas are home to many combat veterans, skilled in guerrilla warfare from the Soviet era in Afghanistan, as well as fighters that have returned from engaging US troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. A major factor would be to keep airstrikes to a minimum for the sake of limiting the deaths of innocent women and children, which serves as a powerful rallying tool for Al-Qaeda.

Al-Qaeda also has support at the highest levels of government and this will limit, even hamper, US-Yemeni cooperation on Al-Qaeda. Yemeni authorities are often loath to act too aggressively towards Al-Qaeda militants, and for good reason. Civilian casualties and the risk of trampling on religious and ideological sensitivities amongst Yemenis are serious problems that President Saleh cannot afford to allow to get out of hand. Also, such a scenario may aggravate the secessionist movement in the South, which Al-Qaeda has vowed to support. Thus, disrupting Al-Qaeda cannot purely be a military prerogative. Indeed, military action should be limited.

The US needs to keep their military and intelligence support to the government as quiet as possible in order to give the government maximum room to manoeuvre, instead of increasing pressure that could lead to the Yemeni government back-pedalling to save face domestically. This could lead to decreased cooperation and attention to the Al-Qaeda problem, which the US cannot solve by itself.

The US would also do well not to trumpet its successes against Al-Qaeda every time militants are killed. This places Yemeni authorities in a difficult position as public resentment increases.

Sound political and economic cooperation and development with Sanaa will also give the US greater bargaining power with the Yemeni government at times when it may be reluctant to fight Al-Qaeda and/or risk public dissent. Tangible and sustainable improvements made to Yemen's economic health and defence structures will make it more worthwhile for Sanaa to pursue AQAP, and thus meet US interests of muting threats posed to US citizens abroad and at home.

AQAP are now sharply in the crosshairs of US-Yemeni military ordinance and intelligence agencies. Mitigating threats from AQAP rests on disrupting their activities through a combination of military action and sound political and economic policies in partnership with the US, aimed at increasing local support for the government to the detriment of AQAP. Denying AQAP a stable operating environment in which widespread local support is absent and the government is willing and able to thwart them is vital to weakening AQAP's effectiveness. All the while, the US should take care not to become trigger happy and push the Yemenis into a corner, jeopardising the fight in the long run.

The views reflected in this paper are those of the author and does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Institute for Islamic Studies (IIIS).