Published:
Pershing Square Capital Management Releases Letter to U.S. Treasury Department Regarding Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
NEW YORK, Sept. 6 /PRNewswire/ -- Pershing Square Capital Management, L.P.
sent the following letter to the U.S. Treasury Department regarding Fannie Mae
(NYSE: FNM) and Freddie Mac (NYSE: FRE):
September 5, 2008
The Honorable Henry M. Paulson, Jr.
Secretary United States Department of the Treasury
1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20220
Re: Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Restructuring
Dear Secretary Paulson:
We understand that a Treasury plan for Fannie/Freddie ("the GSEs") may be
announced this weekend. We thought you might find useful some further
thoughts on potential GSE solutions.
As you are likely aware, we had previously distributed a proposed
restructuring plan for the GSEs. In that plan, under a prepackaged
conservatorship, equity interests would be extinguished, subordinated debt
would be exchanged for warrants, and senior debt would be exchanged for new
senior debt and common equity in the newly recapitalized entities. The
government would write a put to the new common equity holders which would
expire in three years.
It appears, however, that the GSEs may need help more quickly, and
conservatorship may not be triggered until the GSEs are formally determined to
be undercapitalized. As such, in the event the government needs to inject
capital immediately, we suggest you consider the following transaction ("the
Transaction").
In order to minimize risk to tax payers while being equitable to other
constituents, we suggest that the Treasury consider purchasing senior
subordinate debt in the two companies in an amount sufficient to address their
capital needs in the short to intermediate term. This senior sub debt would
be junior in right of payment to the outstanding senior unsecured debt and
senior to the outstanding sub debt, preferred stock, and common equity. We
refer to the outstanding sub debt, preferred and common stock as "the
Subordinate Securities."
The issuance of senior sub debt is permitted under the GSE legislation and
under the existing terms of the outstanding debt and equity securities of the
two entities (please see the attached memo for further details). As a
condition of Treasury's purchase of senior sub debt, the GSEs would defer the
interest payments on the outstanding sub debt (which can be deferred for as
much as five years), and the dividend payments on preferred and common stock.
All of the Subordinate Securities would continue to remain outstanding
according to their existing terms.
The new senior sub debt should have a market-based coupon and Treasury
should receive low-strike price warrants (penny warrants) for a substantial
portion, i.e., 49% of the two companies. The coupon and warrant structure
should be as close to fair-market-value terms as possible. The ultimate
determination of fairness would be the willingness of non-government investors
to purchase the Transaction securities on the same basis as Treasury. As part
of the Transaction, the GSEs would deleverage their capital structures by
paying down senior debt from the free cash flow generated by their core
businesses further improving the position of the new senior sub debt.
The benefits of the Transaction are as follows:
-- The Transaction can be accomplished under the existing terms of the
outstanding GSE securities without any required consent other than from the
GSEs.
-- The new security would be senior in right of payment to the existing
sub debt and preferred stock minimizing the risk to tax payers while providing
substantial support to the outstanding senior debt that has been deemed
implicitly guaranteed by the government.
-- The new debt interest payments would be tax deductible, reducing the
after-tax cost of capital to the GSEs, particularly when compared with
preferred stock.
-- In the event the outlook and performance of the GSEs and their assets
were to improve dramatically, the senior sub debt could be redeemed,
distributions to the Subordinate Securities could resume, and their values
would increase accordingly.
-- In the event that the GSEs' fundamentals continued to deteriorate and
they became undercapitalized, the GSEs could be placed in conservatorship. In
conservatorship, their balance sheets could be restructured along the lines of
our original plan or another plan with the Treasury's senior sub debt treated
preferentially to the Subordinate Securities, again minimizing risk to the tax
payer.
-- The Transaction would be fundamentally fair to all constituents and
would respect the existing terms and corporate hierarchy of all outstanding
GSE securities.
-- The Transaction would minimize moral hazard issues for sub debt,
preferred, and common stock investors.
Most importantly, we believe there are serious negative implications for
other large financial institutions in the event the Treasury were to bail out
Subordinate Security holders. The Treasury and OFHEO have done substantial
research on the benefits to capital market discipline from large financial
institutions' issuance of subordinate debt, and the destructiveness of the
government implicitly or explicitly guaranteeing such obligations.
See: Report to Congress "The Feasibility and Desirability of Mandatory
Subordinated Debt", Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and
United States Department of the Treasury (December 2000), available at:
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/debt/subord_debt_2000.pdf
"Subordinated Debt Issuance by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac", Valerie L.
Smith, Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, OFHEO WORKING PAPERS,
Working Paper 07 - 3 (June 2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1000264;
"Signals from the Markets for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Subordinated
Debt", Robert N. Collender, Samantha Roberts, Valerie L. Smith, Office of
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, OFHEO WORKING PAPERS, Working Paper 07 -
4 (June 2007), available at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1000240&rec=
1&srcabs=1000264 (due to length of the url, please copy and paste into
browser);
"Subordinated Debt and Bank Capital Reform", Douglas D. Evanoff, Federal
Reserve Bank ofChicago, Larry D. Wall, Federal Reserve Bank ofAtlanta, FRB
Atlanta Working Paper No. 2000-24 (November 2000), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=252754.
To the extent the Treasury were to bail out the GSEs' subordinate debt -
which was: (1) never implicitly guaranteed by the government, (2) always
rated below Triple A by the rating agencies, and (3) held by investors who
knowingly took on the risk of loss in exchange for a substantial credit spread
above the GSEs' senior debt - it would endanger the systemic benefits from
subordinate debt issuance for every highly leveraged banking institution in
the world and the capital markets at large.
Furthermore, we do not believe that the Treasury can purchase GSE sub
debt, preferred stock or common stock without incurring an immediate loss to
tax payers because of the enormous amount of existing debt senior to these
instruments. At a market coupon or dividend yield (to the extent that one
were to exist), any debt issued pari passu to the existing sub debt, or
preferred stock issued pari passu or even senior to the existing preferred
stock would require a yield that would be uneconomic for the GSEs. No third-
party investor would purchase these securities regardless of their terms in
light of their junior position in the GSEs' capital structure.
Please note that Pershing Square and affiliates own CDS on the subordinate
debt of the GSEs. We also note that nearly all participants in the capital
market debate on the GSEs are either long or short the outstanding GSE
securities.
We are contemporaneously releasing this letter to the public in the
interest of market transparency.
Respectfully,
William A. Ackman
CONTACT:
William A. Ackman
212-813-3700
SOURCE Pershing Square Capital Management, L.P.
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