Arms Shipment Snafu

The March 25 revelation that the U.S. had accidentally shipped Minuteman missile fuses to Taiwan, instead of helicopter batteries, triggered a strongly worded response from China and apologies from America. USC professors explore the security policies that contributed to the error, and how it impacts America's global image and relationship with China.

The electric circuitry shipped to Taiwan - outdated parts from a system that was operative in the 1960s - may have been fairly sophisticated in the '60s, but now China probably has technology far surpassing that, says Edwin Smith of the USC Gould School of Law, an expert on arms control. And given Taiwan's current relationship with China, Taiwan certainly wouldn't pass along classified information to China. The speed with which Taiwan returned the shipment is also reassuring, Smith notes.

"It's a humiliating mistake more than anything else... unless the Chinese get really upset. But they would have to assume this was an intentional act in order to get really upset," Smith says.

A bigger problem, in Smith's opinion, is the flaw in U.S. security policies that triggered the accident. "A lot of people say that we classify way too much material, so the things that really need to be protected don't get protected as well," he says. "We frequently unnecessarily classify material, and that adds to the burden of the whole system." For example, the fuses in question were supposed to be classified, but were stored with unclassified material.

"It proves that we have so much material, classified and unclassified, that we're not keeping track of it," Smith says. "There are many security services around the world that do not like to deal with the United States because they're not sure how secure their information will be."

Smith is an international law expert focusing on national security and defense, the prevention and management of international crises, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. He is Holder of the Leon Benwell Professorship in Law and International Relations at the USC Gould School.
Contact him at (213) 740-2563 (office), (310) 837-2939 (home office) or esmith@law.usc.edu.

"The export of defense-related devices such as the ICBM fuses mistakenly sent to Taiwan is prohibited by the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) regulations, unless otherwise explicitly waived by the State Department," notes Terrence O'Sullivan, researcher at USC's National Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events. "ITAR regulations aside, this embarrassing incident was almost certainly caused by a bureaucratic snafu, and not intentional.

"Any ensuing threat to U.S. and/or global security interests would be contingent on how damaging to U.S.-Chinese diplomatic relations this might be, given the tremendous political sensitivities the Chinese government has about Taiwan independence and military force projection capabilities," O'Sullivan adds.

"Preventing recurrence of this type of event is largely a matter of tightening up material security and accounting procedures," he concludes. "Clearly there should have been a red flag raised before these fuses ever left U.S. territory."

O'Sullivan is a homeland security expert specializing in terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and U.S. security policy.
Contact him (626) 644-2729 or osulliv@usc.edu.

Clayton Dube is an expert on Sino-American relations and Taiwan's role in that relationship. He is associate director of the USC U.S.-China Institute.

Contact him at (213) 821-3936, (213) 821-4382 or cdube@usc.edu.

judythpiazza@newsblaze.com

   _   _