Published: September 07, 2007

The Qods force - Godfather of Al Qaida?

Share This Story

Since its inception in 1990, the clerics have kept it under such secrecy that even many top officials in Tehran know nothing about the "Qods Force" except the name of its commander, Ahmad Vahidi. The new force, referred to as the "seed of the International Islamic Army" by its commanders, has now turned into the Guards Corps' most active, skilled, and elite unit. It includes the Corps' most experienced commanding officers and personnel. Its task is defined as "commanding, planning, and executing extraterritorial operations of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps."⁹ Its commander directly reports to the regime's leader, Khamenei. The Qods Force directly supervises or at least coordinates all terrorist operations or activities related to the "export of the Islamic Revolution" to various countries. Iranian leaders of their extensive terrorist activities established the Qods Force following a detailed appraisal in the 1980s.

Prior to the formation of the Qods Force, the Guards Corps consisted of the army, the navy, the air force, and the Bassij (paramilitary urban security unit). Formed as an independent body, the Qods Force was placed under the command of the Guards Corps Central Headquarters. The Qods force commander, Vahidi, is a Guards Corps brigadier general and was formerly the commander of the Intelligence Directorate (a key department at the Guards Corps Central Headquarters). Once the Qods Force was formed, the Ramadhan and Ansar headquarters and the Lebanon Corps were placed under Vahidi's command. Despite numerous changes in the Guards Corps in recent years, Vahidi's position has remained unchanged. (See Appendix.)

Final coordination of the Qods Force's activities in a given country and provision of the appropriate diplomatic or other cover for its agents, the use of diplomatic facilities and immunities to get supplies and messages, and provision of arms and military equipment for terrorists fall within the responsibilities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its embassies. The regime's embassies also gather detailed information on the activities of opposition groups and personalities. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs passes on the information to the Qods Force.

Organizational Structure

The most experienced Guards Corps commanders, particularly those active in extraterritorial operations, have been gathered in the General Staff of the Qods Force. In fact, there are no essential differences between members of the Qods Force Staff and the G.C. General Staff. The commanders of Intelligence, Operations, and Training directorates, for instance, are among the Qods Force's key commanders. Commander of the Qods Operations Directorate is G.C. Brigadier General Hussein Moslehi, the ex-commander of the Lebanon Corps. It was under his command that the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut was blown up in 1983. Upon returning from Lebanon, Moslehi assumed command of the 1st Sarollah Corps, the G.C.'s most experienced and largest force in the Iran, Iraq War. The 1st Corps was made up of the Muhammad Rasulullah, Seyyed osh-Shohada, and Ali ibn Abi Talib divisions, which spearheaded the Khomeini regime's offensives in the Iran-Iraq War.

The commander of the Qods Force's Intelligence Directorate, Guards Corps Brigadier General Muhammad-Ja'far Sahraroudi, was previously the commander of Ramadhan Headquarters. He was the field commander involved in the assassination of Abdul-Rahman Qassemlou in Vienna in the summer of 1989 (see Chapter X). Carrying a fake passport with the name of Rahimi, Sahraroudi was arrested by the Austrian police. Following the regime's intervention, however, the Austrian government sent him to Tehran.

The commander of the Training Directorate is Guards Corps Brigadier General Shams. He was the ex-commander of a G.C. base in northwest Iran, subordinate to Ramadhan Headquarters. Subsequently, he headed the 9th Badr Division, comprising Iraqi POWs and nationals who joined the Iranian regime's forces. Shams commanded the regime's forces sent into Iraq in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War. After the unrest in southern Iraq subsided, Shams became the commander of operations in northern Iraq. His deputy, Orouj, commands the Imam Ali training garrison in Tehran. Before his appointment to this post, Orouj was the commander of the Guards Corps Special Security Corps and in charge of Khamenei's bodyguard unit.

Another major section of the Qods Force is its Directorate of Finance, headed by Talebi. Because of the Qods Force's extraterritorial activities, the Directorate has been divided into two sections, one of which makes the financial arrangements for the forces sent abroad. Other key officers of the Qods Force include Manshavi, the head of the Commandant's Office, and Ahmad Salek, Khamenei's representative to the Force. Before the inception of the Qods Force, Manshavi commanded the extraterritorial forces of the G.C. General Staff. He also commanded the Sudanese nationals trained in Iran. Before being transferred to the Qods Force, mullah Salek was the commander in chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Komitehs, which later merged with the national police to form the State Security Forces. Salek is also the director of the Bureau of Islamic Movements in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a majlis deputy, and a member of the Assembly of Experts. He has played an instrumental role in the regime's terrorist actions abroad since 1979. He was also a key figure in the post-Persian Gulf War disturbances in Iraq. Salek attends a meeting with Khamenei every Tuesday.

In addition to the military staff, the Qods Force has a politically oriented staff called the General Staff for the Export of Revolution that handles the export of fundamentalism and terrorism to different countries. Specific assignments are surveyed and parceled out to different directorates of the Qods Force, including the directorates for:

Iraq
Palestine, Lebanon, and Jordan
Turkey
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Indian subcontinent
Western countries (Europe, United States)
North Africa (Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Sudan, and Morocco)
Arabian Peninsula
Republics of the former Soviet Union

According to a Qods Force official, the General Staff for the Export of Revolution was formed with the objective of "removing a fundamental weakness" of the regime's past policy of exporting of revolution. As he put it: "Despite our prior extensive military activities in these countries, the absence of a clear political superstructure did not allow us to reap the maximum benefit from these activities. Now, we are striving to have our own political groups or alternatives in each of these countries, so that our work will bear results."^l0

Each directorate of the General Staff for the Export of Revolution is responsible for establishing political ties with individuals and forces within the country under its jurisdiction to lure them to Khomeini's ideology. For instance, there have been large-scale efforts to forge relations with factions of the Muslim Brotherhood or other religious forces in the Arab countries. Meanwhile, the General Staff for the Export of Revolution has also been active against the regime's opponents. A close confidant of Rafsanjani describes these activities:

The issue of the Mojahedin concerns the Qods Force. The Qods Force has different directorates for different countries. For example, there are directorates for Turkey, Iraq, Afghanistan, etc. If the Iranian nationals - the Mojahedin, the counter-revolutionaries, and so on - engage in some kind of activity against the Islamic Republic, these directorates handle their cases and make the appropriate decisions.¹¹

Affiliated Units

The Qods Force has several command headquarters and bases across Iran where both Iranians and foreign nationals are recruited and trained before being sent abroad. The Qods Force's major training centers include the Imam Ali University, Shahid Kazemi, Beheshti, and Vali-e-asr garrisons. The Force also has special operational units stationed in safe houses in Tehran. They are subjected to rigid intelligence and security restrictions. This is to limit intelligence leaks on other members as well as on the objectives of the special units should any of them be captured in the target country.

The following Guard Corps units are under the command of the Qods Force: The 1st Corps (Ramadhan Headquarters), based in Kermanshah (western Iran); the 2nd (Lebanon) Corps; the 3rd (Hamzeh) Corps, based near Oroumieh, northwestern Iran; the 4th (Ansar) Corps, based in Mashad, northeastern Iran; Corps 5,000; Corps 6,000 (Africa Corps); the 7th Corps; the 8th Corps; and the 9th Badr Corps.

1st Corps, or Ramadhan Headquarters

The 1st Corps began its operations during the Iran-Iraq War and is charged with organizing and providing training and logistics for Kurdish and other small Iraqi groups, as well as gathering operational intelligence. Given its assignments, the organization of this Corps is different from any other G.C. headquarters. The 1st Corps carries out its tasks through five operational bases along the Iran-Iraq border and several tactical bases and posts at various sections of the northwestern, western, and southern fronts: Nasr Garrison in Naqadeh, Fatah Garrison in Sardasht, and Ra'd Garrison in Marivan in Iran's northwest; Zafar Garrison in Sarpol-Zahab in the west; and Fajr Garrison in Zaytoun Mahaleh in Ahwaz in the southwest.

Each of these garrisons has several affiliate command posts. For instance, the Nasr Garrison in Naqadeh has command posts in Piranshahr, Oshnavieh, Badinabad, and Ziveh. It also operates tactical posts in Galirash, Irbil, and Dohuk within Iraq. The 1st Corps' training centers are located in Sabetkhah Training Camp in Gilan-e-Gharb (west) and Ghayour Training Camp in Ahwaz (southwest). When necessary, this Corps coordinates with other bases to use their training camps. Among them are Montazeri Garrison in Kermanshah, Qods Training Camp in Hamedan, and Khatam ol-Anbia Training Camp in Tehran.

In 1991 and 1992, the 1st Corps devoted enormous energy to the assassination of Massoud Rajavi. It was also responsible for a car bomb outside the Sheraton Hotel in Baghdad in January 1992.

2nd (Lebanon) Corps

The command headquarters of the 2nd (Lebanon) Corps is in Damascus, and its forces are stationed in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley. Its main task in Tehran is to provide the Corps in Lebanon with adequate manpower and logistical support. Except for a limited number of permanent personnel, the core of the 2nd Corps' units are changed every three months.

3rd (Hamzeh) Corps

The Hamzeh Headquarters is under the direct supervision of the Guards Corps General Staff. It commands the Qods Force's logistics in northern Iraq and Turkey. The 3rd Corps also provides logistical support for the regime's forces in Turkey and northern Iraq that are connected with the Corps 5,000 (see below), as well as to the 1st Corps (Ramadhan Headquarters)

G.C. Brigadier General Kamal Hedayat, who works under G. C. Commander in Chief Mohsen Rezaii, commands the 3rd Corps. The 3rd Corps' activities in Turkey are reported to Ahmad Vahidi. The Golkhaneh Training Center in Oroumieh (northwest) is one of the 3rd Corps' training centers.

One of the most recent operations the 3rd Corps carried out in coordination with the Corps 5,000 was the assassination of a foreign diplomat in Ankara in March 1992. Javad Tale'i, a Qods Force Commander, directed this operation. Prior to the operation, a Tehran daily had warned Turkey that terrorist groups affiliated with the mullahs' regime would launch subversive operations against Ankara. "Iran must respond appropriately to the confiscation [of the Cape Males cargo ship carrying weapons for the mullahs' regime.] If that entails an eye for an eye, so be it," the daily said.¹²

4th (Ansar) Corps

The 4th Corps previously operated in the framework of the Ansar Headquarters and was charged with the Guards Corps activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan. After the Qods Force was formed, the 8th Samen ol-A'emmeh Corps was strengthened, reorganized, and renamed the 4th Ansar Corps, commanded by G.C. Brigadier General Isma'il Qa'ani, former commander of the G.C. 8th Corps.

The 4th Ansar Corps' main task has been to organize and provide logistics for the Shi'ite Afghan groups residing in Iran. It has also trained and dispatched terrorist squads to Pakistan to assassinate Iranian refugees and Mojahedin activists. Examples include the extensive attacks on the Mojahedin residences in Karachi and Quetta in July 1987. To carry out these tasks, the Ansar Corps has set up bases in Taibad, Zahedan, Zabol, and Birjand along Iran's eastern borders. Forces that are dispatched to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir, and India depart from these bases.

The disintegration of the former Soviet Union and the subsequent fall of the communist regime in Afghanistan suddenly placed great demands on the 4th Ansar Corps. New manpower and budget were infused into the Corps. Central Asia became its highest priority for export of revolution, dispatch of Islamic missionaries, and establishment of direct contacts with fundamentalist groups in the republics.

On February 11, 1992, five members of the Qods Force were arrested by Turkmen border guards while trying to enter the country illegally. They were armed with automatic rifles and grenades and planned to enter Turkmenistan via the Sarakhs border region. The 4th Ansar Corps has also set up a base in the border town of Maku to infiltrate its forces into the Azerbaijan Republic.

Corps 5,000

Corps 5,000 is more limited in numbers than other parts of the Qods Force, but it consists of highly experienced assassination and bombing squads. Their members are chiefly stationed in clandestine safe houses in Tehran and foreign countries. Their contacts are secret and their essential task is to put into action special operations in the target regions, especially Western countries, including Turkey. Foreign nationals are also members of this Corps. Corps 5,000 is responsible for all of Tehran's terrorist activities in Turkey. Receiving logistical support from the 3rd (Hamzeh) Corps, Corps 5,000 has its own independent bases in Iran's western frontier, including its operational headquarters located in Oroumieh, capital of the northwestern province of West-Azerbaijan. The Corps' central command is on Tehran's Pasdaran Street, near the Ministry of Intelligence.

Corps 5,000 planned and executed the regime's biggest terrorist operation in Turkey in the first half of 1992, against the People's Mojahedin Organization. On June 4, terrorist units kidnapped Ali, Akbar Ghorbani, a Mojahedin member, in the Shishli district of Istanbul. The Turkish police found Ghorbani's mutilated body on January 108 31 in Cinarcik, a suburb forty-five kilometers southeast of Istanbul. Interrogation of terrorists arrested for the car-bomb murder of Ugur Mumcu, a Turkish journalist, a few days earlier led to the discovery of Ghorbani's body. Before murdering him, the mullahs' terrorists had severely tortured him, pulling out his fingernails and slashing his genitals.¹³ The Corps 5,000 planted two 50-kilogram bombs in two Mojahedin cars on June 5. The subsequent explosions inflicted heavy damage to the neighboring areas.

The forces of the Malek Ashtar Brigade were transferred to Corps 5,000 after the Qods Force was formed. This brigade previously belonged to the Ramadhan Headquarters and took part in irregular warfare inside Iraq. The Malek Ashtar forces also held positions for some time at the Iran-Iraq southern front. After being incorporated into the Qods Force, this unit was organized in safe houses in Tehran. They were directly involved in the April 1990 assassination of Kazem Rajavi in Geneva.

Corps 5,000 has also sent assassination squads to Britain, Japan, Italy, Switzerland, Germany, and elsewhere. The Corps' operations include the murder of the Japanese translator of the Satanic Verses and an assassination attempt on the life of its Italian translator in summer 1991. It also assassinated Shapour Bakhtiar, the shah's last prime minister, in France in August 1991 in coordination with the 2nd (Lebanon) Corps. Corps 5,000 operational officers were also involved in the explosion of the Pan Am flight over Lockerbie, Scotland, as well as the March 1992 explosion at the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires.

A senior official of the mullahs' regime commented on the role of the Qods Force and its Corps 5,000 in assassinations abroad:

The Qods Force does not operate in partisan methods. Neither does it get involved in the destruction of a garrison, a petrochemical base, or a bridge. Nor does it have a military target. The Qods Force wants its men to carry out operations abroad and return to the country, or reconnoiter individuals as subjects for operations by the special forces. These are the tasks of the Qods Force's Corps 5,000 and 6,000. That is what they do, and they are presently training their men for such purposes. A number of these people are stationed at the Guards Corps General Staff, and some of them have been distributed in Shahid Kazemi building, Imam Ali Garrison in north Tehran, and across the capital. They do not have any specific place. Some stay in houses we have rented for them in Tehran. ... These operational units include expatriates from Islamic countries, like Lebanon and Syria.¹⁴

Corps 6,000

Corps 6,000 is entrusted with the task of exporting fundamentalism to African countries, with the Arab countries of North Africa enjoying top priority. The embassies and cultural centers affiliated with the Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance recruit the ideal individuals in each country. They are subsequently sent to Tehran to undergo political-ideological and military training. They thus acquire adequate preparations to implement their missions, including formation of resistance groups or carrying out terrorist acts, in their respective countries.

Sudan has been turned into the Qods Force's Headquarters in North Africa. The Force is currently centered in the Shambat and Koravi regions and is setting up more camps at the cost of $20 million. The instructional staff comes from the Force's Tehran headquarters. The commander of the base, Majid Kamal, spent the 1980s in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley, helping to organize the Hizbullah in Lebanon. The recruits trained in these bases come from North Africa (Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, and Algeria), but there are some also from Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries. After receiving theoretical and practical training the recruits are taken to southern Sudan for real combat.

9th Badr Corps

The 9th Badr Corps, made up largely of Iraqi POWs, works closely with the 1st Corps (Ramadhan Headquarters) in training for activities inside Iraq's territory.

Training

The commander of the Training Directorate is G.C. Brigadier General Shams, whose deputy is Orouj. The Imam Ali University is the Qods Force's main training center. Located north of the former Sa'dabad Palace in northern Tehran (the headquarters for the shah's Imperial Guard Division), it serves as a terrorist training center for non-Iranian mercenaries. Courses in politics, ideology, demolition, explosives, shooting from a mobile position, weapons training, ambush and counter ambush, pursuit and surveillance, fitness, and hand-to-hand combat are taught there.

Most of the instructors at the university have had a long record in extraterritorial operations. Orouj and Shams also offer instruction themselves. In cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the garrison's personnel department makes travel arrangements for expatriates due to arrive at the University for training. Kuwaiti nationals reportedly received training in the university's April-June 1991 term, and the recruits for the next term were from Kashmir. In a confidential report to the Qods Command in the wake of the assassination of Bakhtiar, an official of this university wrote: "Should we strengthen such training, it will provide us with suitable leverage around the world."¹⁵

The Qods Force also operates a college in Qom called Beit ol-Moqaddas. It is also known as the Melal (Nations) Training Center, because recruits come from different countries. The college offers ideological instructions which are quite different from the traditional teachings at Qom's seminaries. Eighteen Turkish nationals arrested for the car bomb murder of Turkish journalist Ugur Mumcu in Ankara in January 1993 told investigators that they had received training at this center.¹⁶ Khatam and Qa'em centers operate under the jurisdiction of this college. The Khatam Center is in charge of identifying and recruiting forces abroad and the Qa'em Center handles the instructions.

The Beit ol-Moqaddas college offers a six-month curriculum. More than 100 Lebanese, a large number of Iraqis and Turkish nationals, and about 70 Afghan Shi'ites, as well as the 9th Badr Corps' battalion and more senior commanders, have taken the Qa'em training courses. Other instructional garrisons include Beheshti and Vali-e-asr garrisons in Tehran. Their training periods are from three to nine months.

Notes:

9. Ibn Taymiyeh (Taqi od-Din Abu al-Abbas Ahmad), Menhaj as-Sunna an-Nabawya (The Ways and Traditions of the Prophet), First Volume (Cairo: 1962), p.371.

10.Bernard Lewis, "Politics and War," in The Legacy of Islam, 2d ed., ed. Joseph Schacht and C. E. Bosworth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 163.

11. A. P. Petroshevsky, Eslam Dar Iran (Islam in Iran), (Tehran: Marvi Publishing, 1975(

12. Hamilton A. R. Gibb, "Religion and Politics in Christianity and Islam," in Islam and International Relations, ed. J. Harris Proctor (London: Pall Mall, 1965), p.10.

13. Abu Bakr Al-Baghlani, Al-Tamheed, p. 186.

14.Al-Rasa'il (Letters), Third Volume, Political Philosophy of Ikhwan as-Safa (Brethren of Purity), series of articles on Islamic thought (Tehran: 1977), pp. 25-49.

NEWS

WIRES

OTHER