Prachanda's Delhi Sortie: A Summing Up

Share This Story

By M.R. Josse

Now that Maoist supremo Prachanda's much-ballyhooed Delhi dash is a thing of the past how should one remember it? This week's column will attempt a brief summation taking note of its pluses and minuses - for him and his group as well as for a wider audience.

One might begin with the much-bandied-about fact that it represented his first politically significant covert mission to the Indian rajdhani. That is a reality whose significance becomes manifest only when juxtaposed against the backdrop of his umpteen overt trips there since the launch of the Maoists' 'people's war' in February 1996.

In the latter category were excursions not only for engineering the 12-point SPAM pact of 22 November 2005 targeted at regime change in Nepal, but, a month earlier, to formalize an agreement with the Indian Communist Party (Maoist), not to mention clandestine visits before then, in the context of settling differences at the apex level within his own party.

Pluses and Minuses

While it is true that it afforded Prachanda the opportunity to bask in the Indian and international media spotlight - 'like a rock-star' according to the New York Times - for a couple of days, including that in the company of many luminaries, it failed to result in meetings, or indeed even hand-shakes, with Congress (I) President Sonia Gandhi, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee and Home Minister Shiv Raj Patil, as expected by his party flock, not to mention fans in the media and elsewhere.

That such encounters could not, or did not, take place with Gandhi and Singh is all the more striking in as much as they too were co-speakers at the two-day Hindustan Times Leadership Conference. It was probably pre-arranged that Prachanda would address the conference only on its second day, arriving too late on the first or opening day when it was inaugurated and addressed by the Gandhi/Singh duo.

The official explanation put out for that shortcoming is that such tête-à-têtes were not possible since Prachanda's visit to Delhi was merely a private one.

Be that as it may, it will be recalled that, as mentioned in this very space two weeks ago, initially, as Maoist vernacular mouthpiece Janadesh had reported, Prachanda had rejected the invite outright. Mere days later, however, following a meeting with India's point man in Kathmandu Ambassador Shiv Shankar Mukherjee, that decision was overturned.

What should also be noted is that Prachanda and his views have been projected to the wide world by the Indian and international media, particularly since the April Uprising. In other words, it's not as if his ideology or, indeed, his persona was a mystery wrapped in a riddle inside an enigma. In fact, over the past two years or more, interviews with Prachanda in the print and electronic media, both Indian as well as international, have been a pretty regular event.

What would have been politically significant first-time-ever covert events are one-on-meetings with Indian leaders. And that, as already noted, did not come to pass. My hunch is that what made it difficult for such meetings to materialize is India's 'strategic partnership' with the United States with whom she is said to engage furiously in a "war on international terror."

After all, the world's only super power, as one was reminded only the other day by visiting US Secretary of State for South Asia and Central Asia Richard A. Boucher, still regards the Nepal Communist Party (Maoist) as a terrorist outfit. Besides, what should not be forgotten is that the terror tag that the former BJP-led Indian government had placed on the heads of Maoist leaders - this, mind you, much before our 'democratic' governments did so - has not been withdrawn.

Terrorist Tag, No Release

Indeed, despite Indian Marxist leader and Maoist supporter Sitaram Yechuri's hint in Kathmandu (Himalayan Times, 17 November 2006) that the government of India would remove the terrorist tag from the Maoists it has not happened thus far, despite Prachanda's just concluded excursion to New Delhi.

Likewise, Yechuri's oft-repeated promise that Nepali Maoists languishing in Indian jails would be released "soon" has still to materialize, Prachanda's high visibility dash to Delhi notwithstanding.

One carefully read what was reported about Prachanda's advocacy of a Maoist version of multi-party democracy at the forum provided by the Hindustan Times. Speaking on the topic, Democracy: The Forbidden Fruit or Nectar for Progress, Prachanda ridiculed parliamentary democracy labeling it as "farcical". While admitting that he has not compromised on his ideological beliefs, it remains to be seen how far, if at all, he has convinced his audience that he is committed to democracy as it is generally known.

As he reportedly stated: "The political democracy raised over monopoly capitalist base got reduced to mere formal democracy, with majority of the people only participating in election rituals. This is the common scenario of farcical state of democracy in most of the developed capitalist countries today...One can observe this farce of electoral democracy better in South Asia than anywhere else."

Similarly, it is also not clear at this stage whether he has managed to convince the movers and shakers in New Delhi, or other world capitals, that the Maoists are about to bid a farewell to arms. His commitment to accept the verdict of the people as reflected in elections to a constituent assembly but not if it favours the King is bound to have raised doubts whether the Maoists are prepared to accept any political verdict other than one that is completely in conformity to their ideology.

And if that is the case, why should the nation go forward to elections that are not only meant to be free and fair, and completely shorn of any threats, but also to reflect the natural diversity of public opinion?

Pleasing to India

Prachanda's utterances before, after and during his Delhi yatra, particularly those relating to India, are noteworthy, including his pre-departure statement that India is no longer "a reactionary power" because "India is no longer backing constitutional monarchy."

His reference to former Indian Prime Minister I.K. Gujral's laudatory comments about the Maoist revolution is interesting, not least because it is in stark contrast to what Gujral communicated to Prime Minister Lokendra Bahadur Chand after he was nominated to his position by King Gyanendra, a week after dismissing Sher Bahadur Deuba on 4 October 2002.

As noted from my files, Gujral, in his congratulatory message to Chand, admitted that India has a vested interest in steering Nepal out of the difficult circumstances "particularly when it comes to dealing with forces of terror whose inhuman conduct is a threat to the stability of the region." A clear volte face by Gujral, or what?

His statement at a press conference in New Delhi that "ISI-type people" had offered the Maoists assistance during the insurgency but that his party had "firmly" turned it down would have been far more credible if it had been made in Kathmandu much before his latest sojourn in New Delhi - and irrefutable evidence of the same provided. As it is, it only helps to suggest that he was speaking to please his Indian hosts.

What would have made that charge much more credible would be if it were also linked to the activities of ISI's Indian cousins in Nepal. As is well known, Indian intelligence agencies, including RAW, have been having a field day in Nepal for years! In fact, most readers will recall that a couple of months before the 12-point SPAM pact was readied even the Times of India had reported (and this journal had recorded) in a front page scoop that Indian "spooks" had escorted Prachanda's second in command, Baburam Bhattarai, to various meetings in the Indian capital.

Given the Maoists' intermittent presence in India for years - admitted by Prachanda himself - the lay reader might be compelled to question if the all-powerful ISI could be as moronic as to believe it could influence the Maoists to wage a war against India given the realities on the ground.

Prachanda's perceived attempt to please India at all costs also comes across in his comment that it was Pakistan that was one of the first countries to support the King's takeover. Most countries that do not believe in interfering in the domestic affairs of others, and in his category are a host of countries not only Pakistan, adopted a similar posture.

From the above, it would appear that Prachanda's greatly hyped covert mission to India may not, indeed, have reaped the benefits that his fans believe it has. I would be mightily surprised if it will result, in the long run, in increasing the Maoists' appeal within the corridors of power in Hindustan.

Who knows, the "benefits" of the foray might turn out to be more than counter-balanced by its "costs" particularly among those who believe that the Maoists are a genuinely nationalistic force or have forsaken the gun?

The course of future events will, however, be the final arbiter.

alan@newsblaze.com